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How Much Should Mind Matter? Mens Rea in
Theft and Fraud Sentencing

T

JAMES GIBSON
Attorney-Adviser, u_s_
Sentencing Commission.

J.D., 1995, University of
Virginia School of Law.
The views in this article
do not necessarily reflect
the position of
the LJ_S_ Sentencing
Commission_

he U.S. Sentencing Commission recently
voted to publish a proposal in the Federal
Register that revises the definition of"loss,"
the primary determinant of sentence length for theft
and fraud offenses.' [Ed. Note: The Commission
proposal is reproduced at p.168 of this issue ofFSR.]
Anyone who has followed the Commission's deliberations on loss will see that the proposed definition
attempts to address many of the contentious issues
that have arisen in the case law and commentary.
The issues that the proposed definition concentrates
on, however, such as credits, interest, causation, and
gain, tend to inform the inquiry into "actual loss"
rather than "intended loss," even though the latter
concept is integral to both definitions.
Although neither the current nor the proposed
definition provides much guidance for working with
intended loss, the Commission did preserve the
"whichever is greater" rule that is currently found in
the fraud guideline: if the loss that the defendant
intended is higher than the actual loss that occurred,
use intended loss as the final loss figure. It also
added a short definition of the term: '"Intended loss'
means the [economic] harm intended to be caused by
the defendant and other persons for whose conduct
the defendant is accountable under § 181.3 [and that
realistically could have occurred]." 2
Unfortunately, both the "whichever is greater"
rule and the proposed intended loss definition are
seriously flawed. As the following discussion will
demonstrate, the "whichever is greater" rule has the
effect of treating different defendants similarly, and
the proposed definition fails to account for certain
mental states that may merit increased punishment
even though they do not rise to the level of"intent."
Correcting these shortcomings would improve the
loss definition and help ensure that federal courts
impose properly proportionate sentences.
I. The "Whichever Is Greater" Rule
A. What the Nanny Trial Can Teach Us

In order to show that the "whichever is greater" rule
is fundamentally flawed, let me turn to a seemingly
unrelated area of the law, one familiar to anyone who
followed last autumn's infamous "nanny trial": homicide sentencing. As we all remember, a Massachusetts jury convicted British nanny Louise Woodward
of second-degree murder in the death of an infant in
her care, eight-month-old Matthew Eappen. As a
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result, she faced a sentence oflife in prison, with the
possibility of parole after fifteen years. Judge Hiller
Zobel, however, reduced the con-viction to involuntary manslaughter and sentenced Woodward to the
nine months she had already served.
Judge Zobel overruled the verdict not because of
any dispute about the result of Woodward's conduct-like the jury, he believed that Woodward's
criminally culpable actions caused Matthew's deathbut because the evidence did not show the "malice
... supporting a conviction for second degree
murder." J In other words, the difference between a
life sentence and "time served" was not the harm
done, but the harm intended or foreseen.4 A murder
conviction contemplates a defendant who either sets
out to kill someone or engages in conduct that
constitutes an obvious risk to someone's life, s
whereas involuntary manslaughter (and its more
lenient punishment) is reserved for those who
produce the same result with a less pernicious
mens rea.
Suppose, however, that Matthew Eappen had
merely suffered a minor injury. The jury, if it truly
believed that Woodward intended to kill the child,
would have convicted her of attempted murder.
Judge Zobel, with his more charitable view of
Woodward's mens rea, would probably have allowed
only a conviction for simple assault and battery. The
difference in punishment is again significant, and
again turns solely on the difference in mens rea. (A
conviction for attempted murder in Massachusetts
can result in a sentence of up to ten years in prison twenty if poison, drowning, or strangulation was
involved 6 -whereas a simple assault defendant is
subject to no more than a five-year sentence, and only
two-and-a-half years if the victim was an adult.7)
In ranking the seriousness of homicide and
assault offenses, therefore, both the actual result of
the crime and the result that the defendant intended
play a role. The law reserves its most severe punishment for those who both intend to and do cause
death. Those who intend to and do cause mere injury
receive the lightest punishment. Finally, those who
intend death but cause only injury and those who
intend (at most) an injury but cause death fall
somewhere in between. And this is as it should be:
two people who cause the same result should not
receive the same punishment if one had a more evil
intent, and two people with the same evil intent
should not receive the same punishment if the
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conduct of one produced more harmful real-world
consequences than the conduct of the other.
B. The Loss Analogy

The logic we find in homicide and assault sentencing, however, is absent from both the current loss
definition and the new draft definition that the
Commission recently published. In both versions,
the Commission focuses on the very same elements
that distinguish homicide offenses from one another:
the actual harm that the offense caused, and the
harm that the defendant intended. Fraud defendants,
however, are sentenced based on the actual loss that
they caused or the loss that they intended, whichever is
greater.I While this may appear at first blush to be a
methodology sensitive both to a defendant's mens rea
and to the actual harm that resulted, it is in fact a
methodology that renders one of these two factors
completely irrelevant to the defendant's sentence
whenever the other is higher. It is the equivalent of
sentencing a manslaughter defendant to life in prison
merely because he or she caused the same result as a
cold-hearted murderer, with no "discount" for the
difference in mindset.
The most commonly cited justification for the
"whichever is greater" rule is that it is necessary to
ensure that defendants whose frauds are exposed
before they cause any actual harm are not sentenced
too leniently. And it is true that a defendant who
intends a $150,000 loss but whose fortuitous
apprehension prevents the loss from exceeding, say,
$io,ooo deserves more punishment than a defendant who intended to and did cause no more than a
$io,ooo loss. But the "whichever is greater" rule is a
poor solution to this problem, for two reasons.
First, in an effort to ensure that inchoate frauds
are not treated too leniently, the rule treats them too
harshly. An inchoate crime deserves a less severe
sentence than a completed crime, because the realworld consequences of one's behavior matter.
Attempted murder is just as serious as murder in
terms of mens rea, but the actual harm that a
murderer causes merits a greater punishment over
the attempted murderer. This is not to say that the
serious nature of an attempted murderer's mens rea
should play no part in sentencing; it should simply
not be the only factor that determines sentence. To
focus only on mens rea is the equivalent of sentencing all drunk drivers as if they had committed
vehicular homicide, on the grounds that only mere
fortuity prevented their irresponsible behavior from
causing someone's death. Such a policy strikes us as
absurd only because we instinctively realize that the
actual harm that criminals cause is just as important
in sentencing as their mindset. Intended loss should
therefore never be the only factor that a court con-
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siders when sentencing a theft or fraud defendant.
Second, even if one disagrees with the preceding
point and believes that inchoate crimes do deserve
the same punishment as completed crimes, the
"whichever is greater" rule is overbroad. It does
ensure that the evil-minded criminal will not be
treated too leniently merely because his or her fraud
was interrupted before it could bear fruit. Unfortunately, it also ensures that less evil mindsets will be
ignored in many instances. Suppose, for example,
that we have an experienced, previously reliable
government contractor who submits the lowest bid
for a new project, but falsely states on the application
that he has never been convicted of a criminal
offense. He wins the contract and receives an initial
installment of $i5o,ooo, but the fraud is discovered
before any significant work has been done. The
evidence clearly shows that despite his misrepresentation he intended to perform the contract in full and
was capable of doing so, so the intended loss is zero.
The actual loss is $i5o,ooo. In such a case, the
"whichever is greater" rule would produce a loss
amount of $i5olooo. In other words, the contractor
would suffer the same fate as a con artist who
intended merely to pocket the $i5o,ooo and skip
town, even though the latter's mens rea is indisputably more pernicious. 9
A similar fate befalls the debtor who fraudulently
procures an unsecured $i5o,ooo loan with the intent
and ability to repay it on schedule, but who is caught
and arrested before any payments are due. The
debtor, having already received the loan proceeds
from the bank, is accountable under the current and
proposed loss definitions for a $i5o,ooo loss; he or
she is treated just like a defendant who stole
$I5o,ooo from the bank's vault. But is the debtor
who intends no loss to the bank truly deserving of the
same punishment as the thief who intends to make
off with the full $I5o,ooo?
In short, the "whichever is greater" rule, in
trying to minimize the effect of fortuity on sentences,
produces illogical results. By ignoring actual loss
when intended loss is higher, the rule sentences
inchoate crimes as harshly as completed crimes,
even though the criminal law normally recognizes a
sub-stantive distinction between the two. By ignoring
intended loss when actual loss is higher, the rule
wrongly ignores the less serious mens rea of the
defendant who, but for a fortuitous apprehension,
would have given the victims some value for
their money.
What is needed, then, is a method that can
account for both mens rea and actual harm in every
case, a method that never ignores either factor. One
possibility is determining the loss amount based on
actual loss only, with intended loss as an encouraged
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departure factor. This method has the advantage of
simplicity, but too many cases would involve different
intended loss and actual loss amounts to make it the
best choice. Departures should be reserved for
relatively rare fact patterns.
A better rule would be to sentence defendants
based on the average of their actual loss and intended
loss. While this method may frighten members of
the mathematically challenged legal profession, it in
fact demands little more effort than the current loss
definition. The "whichever is greater" rule already
requires the courts to determine both the actual loss
and the intended loss in every case; an averaging rule
would add one simple step.
Indeed, if we view mens rea and actual harm as
of roughly equal importance in determining theft and
fraud sentences, a method like averaging that
accounts for each in equal measure is the only
method that makes sense. Suppose we have the
following four defendants: Defendant A sets out to
and does cause $i5o,ooo in loss. Defendant B's
$15o,ooo scheme is discovered after causing only
$io,ooo in actual loss. Defendant C fraudulently
procures an unsecured $15o,ooo loan, with the
intent and ability to pay it back, but is apprehended
before any payments are due. Defendant D both
intends and causes a loss of $io,ooo.
Under the "whichever is greater" rule, Defendants A, B, and C are each accountable for loss
figures of $I5o,ooo. Defendant D is accountable for
$io,ooo. Under an averaging approach, the same
results obtain for Defendants A and D, but the loss
amounts for Defendants B ($8o,ooo,the average of
$I5o,ooo intended and $io,ooo actual) and C
($75,000, the average of zero intended and $i5o,ooo
actual) fall somewhere in between the other two, just
as the sentences for attempted murder and involuntary manslaughter fall somewhere in between the
sentences for murder and simple assault. Defendant
B is sentenced more leniently than Defendant A for
the same reason that attempted murder is sentenced
more leniently than completed murder: less actual
harm. Defendant C is sentenced more leniently than
Defendant A for the same reason that involuntary
manslaughter is sentenced more leniently than
completed murder: less serious mens rea. Note,
however, that neither Defendant B nor Defendant C
is sentenced as leniently as Defendant D; the
averaging method ensures that Defendant B's evil
intent and the harmful effects of Defendant C's
criminality push their sentences upward.
As this example shows, the averaging method
would produce a lower loss figure than the "whichever is greater" rule for any defendant whose
intended loss differs from his or her actual loss. In
fact, if the Commission were to replace the "which-
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ever is greater" rule with the averaging method, a
defendant whose unrealized aim was a multimilliondollar fraud would see more of a reduction in his or
her loss figure than someone who plotted to steal just
a little. If one accepts the premise that intent and
actual harm are of roughly equal importance in theft
and fraud sentencing, however, this "lowering effect"
is inevitable; any perceived inequity demonstrates not
that the averaging method is too lenient, but that the
current system is too imprecise.
Nevertheless, the lowering effect would seem to
be an inopportune result of the averaging method,
given the Commission's current proposals to raise
theft and fraud sentences.0 The Commission's
interest in higher theft and fraud penalties, however,
itself provides a solution to the lowering effect:
because the loss tables are currently "in play," the
Commission can simply adjust the tables upward to
account for any unwanted lowering effect that the
averaging method (or, in fact, any aspect of the new
loss definition) would have on defendants' sentences.
Indeed, the simultaneous revision of the loss tables
and the loss definition allows the Commission first to
focus on crafting an efficient, workable, principled
definition of loss and then change the loss tables to
account for any politically unpopular reduction in loss
figures that the definition produces.
II."Intent" and "Intended Loss"

Another way of mitigating the lowering effect that the
averaging method would have on loss levels is to
expand the scope of the intended loss concept.
Neither the current nor proposed definition of
intended loss accounts for states of mind that
arguably deserve punishment but that do not rise to
the level of intent. In contrast, the proposed definition of actual loss hinges on the element of foreseeability," thereby acknowledging that unintended
harms may have a role to play in theft and fraud
sentencing. Given this acknowledgment, perhaps the
Commission should examine the intended loss
concept to see if it merits similar revision.
Suppose we have a post office employee who
steals credit cards and sells them for $ioo each.
Although she is aware that her buyers use the credit
cards to make illegal purchases, her intent is merely
to make $ioo per theft. Her intended loss would
include the loss to the credit card owners only if we
stretch "intent" beyond its normal legal meaning: she
would have to be accountable for those losses that she
knew would occur as a consequence of her actions,
even though the credit card charges were not the goal
2
of her criminal acts.
Or suppose we have an investment broker who
takes more risks with his clients' money than he was
authorized to do. He may well intend for the risky
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investments to pay off, and they may not be so risky
that one can say he knows that a loss will occur, but
he is certainly being reckless regarding the possibility
of a loss. Nevertheless, his intended loss would be
zero. In fact, if he gets lucky and the investments
pan out, his actual loss would also be zero, resulting
in no offense level increase for loss despite the great
risks he took.
Anyone who endured the first year of law school
will recognize that the foregoing examples draw
distinctions between the various states of mens rea
that the criminal law uses to define statutory offenses. "Intent" (also known as "purpose") is the
most serious mens rea, with "knowledge" coming
next, followed by "recklessness" and "criminal
negligence."3 By concentrating on intent alone, the
Commission has implicitly decided to ignore the
lesser criminal mental states. This would not
necessarily be a problem if it was an explicit policy
decision, but the emphasis on actual loss issues has
largely kept intended loss issues such as this out of
the Commission's view.
Of course, a more sophisticated theft and fraud
sentencing scheme would produce a different
punishment for each different mens rea. The "intent"
or "purpose" defendant would receive a greater
sentence increase than the "knowing" defendant,
who in turn would receive a greater increase than the
"reckless" defendant (assuming the same actual loss
in each case). Neither the current nor the proposed
structure of the loss guideline, however, lends itself
to such distinctions, and including such a fine level
of detail in the theft and fraud guidelines would likely
be more problematic than useful. The Commission
therefore needs to make a policy decision regarding
whether knowledge and recklessness are sufficiently
serious and common mental states to merit inclusion
in the existing intended loss concept. The proposed
approach, in which these concepts are subsumed in
an encouraged departure for unrealized "risk of
loss,"

4

may be adequate, but the Commission should

explicitly consider whether it makes sense to deal
with just one level of mens rea (intent) in the intended
loss calculation and leave others (knowledge and
recklessness) for departure.
Of course, the averaging method works just fine
without expanding the current definition of intended
loss. And the inclusion of foreseeable losses in the
actual loss concept does not necessitate a revision of
intended loss; regardless of whether the same mens
rea element is present in each concept, random
chance will ensure that the actual loss and the loss
that a defendant intended or risked are not always
identical. But an expansion of intended loss would go
a long way toward mitigating the lowering effect that
the averaging method would have on current loss
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levels. For instance, without the expansion our shady
investment broker who risks and loses $ioo,ooo of
his clients' money would be accountable for a
$ioo,ooo loss under the current and proposed loss
definition, as opposed to just $50,000 under the

averaging method.5 Expand the scope of intended
loss to include the concept of recklessness, however,
and even the averaging method produces a loss figure
of $1O0,O00.
III. Conclusion
One of the difficulties in formulating rules to govern
the determination of loss is that someone can almost
always devise a hypothetical fact pattern for which a
proposed rule is inadequate. The Commission
nevertheless only needs to worry about those fact
patterns that are common enough to warrant specific
commentary. It can leave less frequently occurring
cases in the capable hands of individual judges,
confident that even if they are resolved differently in
different courtrooms their smaller number will have
little effect on overall disparity in federal sentencing.
The hypothetical examples given in the above
discussion, however, represent categories of cases
that are already addressed in the current guidelines,
and which therefore presumably occur often enough
to merit constant reevaluation. Procurement frauds,
loan application frauds, credit card thefts, inchoate
offenses, and cases in which intended loss and actual
loss differ all occur frequently enough that the
Commission has seen fit to write special rules for
them. In the course of reforming the loss definition,
then, the Commission must consider whether the
rules that govern intended loss, and which therefore
affect all these cases, are adequate.
Notes
'See63 Fed. Reg. 614-19 (1998). The Commission actually
published two options for revision of the loss definition, but both
handle intended loss in the same way, so Ishall refer to them
together as the proposed definition.
2
1d. at 615, 616. The bracketed language occurs only in the second
option; the brackets indicate that the Commission isconsidering but
is unsure about adding that language.
3
Commonwealth v.Woodward, No. Crim: 97-0433,1997 WL 694119,
at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 1997).
4
One may argue that Judge Zobel imposed too light a punishment;
even with the reduced conviction, Woodward could have been
sentenced to as much as twentyyears in prison. See MAss. GEN.
LAWSANN. ch. 265, § 13 (West 1997). The point, however, is that
Massachusetts, like other jurisdictions, provides for significantly
longer sentences for murderers than for those convicted of
manslaughter. According to the most recent national statistics, the
average sentence for murder is 279 months, with 105 months
served. Involuntary manslaughter sentences average 122 months,
with 40 months served. CRAIG
PERKINS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE,
NATIONAL
CORRECTIONS
REPORTING
PROGRAM, 1992 tbls. 1-14 & 2-6 (1994).
'For instance, the prosecution inthe nanny trial attempted to prove
malice by showing that Woodward engaged in conduct that a
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reasonable person would have known created a "plain and
strong likelihood" of death. Woodward, 1997 WL 694119,
at *3.
6
Massachusetts law has two statutes that could apply to what I call
"attempted murder." "Attempt to murder" applies if poisoning,

drowning, or strangulation was involved. See MASS.GEN.LAWSANN.
ch. 265, § 16. Otherwise the "assault with intent to commit
murder" statute governs. See id. § 15.
7
1d.§§ 13A & 13J. Other jurisdictions obviously have other statutory
constraints, but the relative ranking of offense seriousness is the
same: murder is more serious than attempted murder and
manslaughter, which are more serious than simple assault.
8
See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment. (n.7) (1997); 63 Fed. Reg. 615,
616(1998). In contrast, the current theft guideline makes no
mention of intended loss, see U.S.S.G. § 2131.1, which has led
courts to some rather convoluted conclusions about the
Commission's reasoning. See, e.g., United States v. Kopp, 951
F2d 521,529-30 & n. 13 (3d Cir. 1992).
9
See United States v. Schneider, 930 F2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Posner, J.) (drawing distinction between con artist and legitimate
contractor). This hypothetical is a slight variation of the facts from
Schneider; in Schneider, the contractor's fraud was discovered
before any payment was made, resulting in no actual loss (except
for the costs of finding a new contractor). Id. at 556-58.
10
See 63 Fed. Reg. 602-04 (1998) (featuring proposals for amending
the loss tables in U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1(b)(1) and 2F1.1(b)(1) so as to
raise theft and fraud sentences).
1
See63 Fed. Reg. 615,616 (1998) ("'Actual loss' means the
reasonably foreseeable harm resulting from the conduct for which
the defendant is accountable .... ).
12
As one might expect, this has not prevented creative prosecutors
from arguing for an expansion of the intended loss concept. See,
e.g., United States v. Wells, 127 F3d 739, 745-48 (8th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting prosecution argument that "intended loss" means
"possible loss that could arise from the charged crime"). Such
expansion does seem inappropriate under the current language,
especially since 1991 when the Commission removed "probable
loss" from the concept of "intended loss." See U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION,
GUIDELINES
MANUAL
app. C at

210 (1997).

3

For the most succinct definition of these terms, see MODELPENALCODE
§ 2.02 (1985).
4
See 63 Fed. Reg. 617 (1998) (encouraging a departure when "the
offense created a serious risk of substantially greater economic
harm than the loss that actually occurred.").
11$100,000 actual plus $0 intended, divided by two.
16$100,000 actual plus $100,000 intended or recklessly risked,
divided by two.
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